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What is a Twentieth Century Constitution?
by Peter E. Quint
At present, almost all of the constitutions in the
world are 20th Century constitutions –- and, indeed, most
of them were not adopted until the second half of the 20th
Century. Accordingly, the 18th Century Constitution of the
United States -- which includes the original constitution
of 1787-89, the first ten amendments, adopted in 1791, and
the Eleventh Amendment, adopted in 1798 -- antedates most
other constitutions of the world by at least 150 years.
Using the 18th Century Constitution of the United
States as a form of base-line (a method that may be
parochial, but one that I think also has a lot to be said
for it) we can examine the characteristics of modern
constitutions -- that is, the characteristics of 20th
Century constitutions.
Also, for purposes of convenience -– and in the hope
that it will not distort the inquiry too much -- we will
proceed with an examination of two specific 20th Century
constitutions: The Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Germany, adopted shortly after World War II in 1949, and an
important constitution adopted at the very end of the 20th
Century, the Constitution of South Africa. This
examination may require some backward glances at two
earlier 20th Century constitutions: in the case of Germany,
the predecessor of the present constitution, the Weimar
Constitution of 1919; and in the case of South Africa, the
immediate predecessor of the present constitution, the
Interim Constitution of 1994. Finally, where appropriate,
the discussion will also draw on another important 20th
Century constitution, the Constitution of India of 1950.
What are the most striking differences and contrasts
between the 18th Century Constitution of the United States
and its 20th Century counterparts?
1. Brevity and Style
The 18th Century Constitution of the United States is a
document of the Enlightenment. It is short and, in the
main, elegantly written. It has an economy of construction

that sometimes conveys the framers’ underlying thinking
through structure rather than express statement. The
separation of powers, for example, is outlined through the
division of the articles: Article I, (legislative); Article
II (executive); Article III (judiciary). Within Article I,
the House of Representatives, the popular house of the
legislature, comes first because it was the organ that, in
the view of the framers, was to be the most powerful
according to the nature of things (and therefore also the
most dangerous). Then comes the Senate whose function was
seen largely as exercising a check on the House of
Representatives.
Both of our 20th Century constitutions -- those of the
Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa -- are
considerable longer and more detailed (see below). It may
be questioned whether the structure of these constitutions
conveys much subtlety of meaning -- although it is indeed
clear that the Basic Rights (constitutional rights) were
placed at the beginning of the Basic Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany, for the purpose of emphasizing that
the new West German state of 1949 was turning its back on
the atrocities of the Nazi period.1
2. Limits and Discretion, or more?
In its brevity and by its nature, the 18th Century
Constitution of the United States may perhaps best be
characterized as a constitution of limits and discretion.
The function of most constitutional provisions was
primarily to establish the institutions of the federal
government, to explain how they work, and to confer power
on those institutions -- a power which in almost every
instance is discretionary. That is, these are powers that
Congress (or the, in some instances, the executive) has
discretion to exercise but in almost all instances has no
obligation to exercise. Congress, for example, is granted
authority to regulate commerce among the several states -but it has no obligation to do so and, indeed, until the
1

In Germany, the Weimar Constitution of 1919 was even
longer than the Basic Law, and contained many adventurous
provisions. The Constitution of India, often said to be the
longest in the world, contains approximately 390 sections,
as well as twelve “schedules,” containing additional
material. The schedules alone occupy more than 50 pages in
the printed volume of the constitution.
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final decade of the 19th Century, its regulations of
commerce were relatively few in number and narrow in scope.2
In addition to these discretionary empowering
provisions, the 18th Century Constitution of the United
States imposes certain limits on governmental power.
According to the Federalists’ original conception, of
course, most of these limits were thought to be implicit in
the concept of enumerated powers -- what the Constitution
did not grant to the federal government it prohibited to
that government. But even the original Constitution did
contain some explicit limitations on Congress in Article 1
Section 9, as well as a few (rather exceptional)
limitations on the states in Article 1 Section 10. Of
course, bowing to the pressures of certain Anti-Federalists
and others, the framers added the Bill of Rights, the first
ten amendments, which contained explicit limitations on
government. The 11th Amendment, narrowing the jurisdiction
of the federal courts, was added in 1798.
But the one thing that the 18th Century Constitution of
the United States did not do was to impose significant
obligations on the government -- to instruct the government
that it must act in a certain manner and had no discretion
to decline to do so. Thus, the 18th Century Constitution of
the United States essentially imposed no obligations on the
federal government to furnish any particular services to
its citizens, such as education, social welfare, health
care, etc. In part, this characteristic of the 18th Century
Constitution reflected a conception of the limited role of
government that was characteristic of the period. In part,
however, this characteristic also resulted from the role of
the Constitution of the United States as a constitution for
a federal union composed of states. To the extent that it
was thought appropriate for government to exercise such
functions, they were thought to be functions of the states
or localities, and even very early state constitutions
contained obligations to furnish education.
This characteristic of the 18th Century Constitution of
the United States has carried on even into the 20th Century
-- notwithstanding significant additional regulations of
2

Of course, once Congress has exercised its discretion to
enact a statute, the President is obliged to “take care”
that the statute is “faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. Art.
II, §3.
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the American states included in the 14th Amendment, adopted
in 1868 after the conclusion of the Civil War. Thus in
relatively recent cases such as Harris v McRae,3 the Supreme
Court (in dictum) emphasized that there is no
constitutional obligation on the states to pay the cost of
abortions -- or, by extension, to support any other form of
health care and, in the DeShaney4 case, the Court made clear
that the government ordinarily has no constitutional
obligation to protect one individual against another.
Of course, our 20th Century constitutions could not be
more different in this respect. They impose obligations of
social welfare, education and other services on government.5
But our two 20th Century constitutions do this in rather
different ways. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany is rather more restrained on this score, while the
Constitution of South Africa contains a proliferation of
such provisions.
The German Basic Law does explicitly require the state
to provide education for its citizens (Article 7 GG), and
it also requires the state to pay a stipend to “every
mother” 6 -- a term that has been interpreted to mean
pregnant women, as well as mothers during the first year of
an infant’s life. In general, however, the “positive”
rights of the German Basic Law are implied in the laconic
provision of article 20 (1) GG stating that “the Federal
Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal
state.” Although this “social state” clause is generally
understood to require the legislature to provide a basic
level of social welfare, it has generally been used only
interstitially as a source of law by the German
Constitutional Court. In a recent important case, for
example, the Constitutional Court has required that a
3

448 U.S. 297 (1980).

4

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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At least the South African Constitution also imposes an
obligation on the state to protect individuals against
other individuals under some circumstances. Carmichele v.
Ministers, 2001 (4) SALR 938 (CC).

6

Art. 6 (4) GG.
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certain minimal amount of income -- the “existence minimum”
–- must remain free of income taxation.7 Perhaps because the
German legislature has ordinarily provided relatively
generous social welfare measures, the “social state”
provision of the Basic Law has not yet been used to require
new social programs of significance.
In contrast with the laconic “social state” clause in
Germany, the Constitution of South Africa contains prolific
social welfare provisions. Thus, section 26 provides a
“right to have access to adequate housing”, and the state
must take certain measures to achieve this right. There are
also rights to health care, “sufficient food and water” and
social security8 and there is a long list of social welfare
rights for children.9 Furthermore, section 25(5) declares
that the state should “foster conditions” for equitable
access to land.
Although these social welfare provisions of the South
African Constitution purport to grant “rights” to citizens,
these “rights” are rather substantially qualified. Thus the
obligations of the state under sections 26 and 27 are
limited to “reasonable legislative and other measures,
within [the state’s] available resources, to achieve the
progressive realization” of these rights. Of course, the
basic issue that arises with respect to rights of this
nature is the extent to which courts can actually enforce
provisions of this kind, especially in a country in which
governmental resources seem to be thoroughly inadequate to
complete the massive tasks of social reconstruction that
would be involved. Indeed, up to this point, the South
African Constitutional Court has been extremely modest in
its interpretation of these provisions -- except in one
striking case in which, probably due to the pledge of free
pharmaceuticals from a manufacturer, the court ordered
wide-scale distribution of drugs to combat the spread of
AIDS from mother to children.10
7

93 BVerfGE 121 (1995).
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Section 27.

9

Section 28.
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Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5)
SALR 721 (CC). See generally Albie Sachs: “Social and
Economic Rights: Can They Be Made Justiciable?”, 53 S.M.U.
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There is yet another method of handling social welfare
provisions that has been adopted in a number of 20th Century
constitutions. Instead, of referring to the state’s social
welfare obligations as yielding “rights”, the Constitution
of India -- drawing on a technique devised in the Irish
constitution in the 1920s -- refers to these social welfare
provisions as “Directive Principles of State Policy.”
According to Article 37 of the Constitution of India, these
principles shall be “fundamental in the government of the
country”, but they are not to be “enforceable by any
court.” Yet, over the years, the Supreme Court of India has
sometimes employed these “directive principles” in the
interpretation of constitution provisions in a manner
which, in the last analysis, seems to accord these
principles some actual legal force.11 A similar technique
was employed in a number of the new constitutions of the
East German states, adopted shortly after German
unification, in which social welfare provisions were
sometimes referred to as incorporating “state goals”.12
3. Rights of the “Third Generation”.
Social welfare rights are sometimes referred to as
“rights of the second generation” to distinguish them from
the traditional form of “negative” rights –- prohibiting
the government from undertaking certain invasions of person
or property -- such as rights of free expression, rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, rights against
compulsory self incrimination, etc. These traditional
rights -- found, for example, in the American Bill of

L. Rev. 1381 (2000); Mark Tushnet, “Social Welfare Rights
and the Forms of Judicial Review”, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1895
(2004).
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In addition to the “directive principles of state
policy”, the Constitution of India also includes a list of
“fundamental duties” of Indian citizens. See CI §51-A. The
Weimar Constitution of 1919 also contained constitutional
“duties”, as did several earlier constitutions. See Gerhard
Casper, “Changing Concepts of Constitutionalism: 18th to
20th Century,” 1989 Supreme Court Review 311.
12

See, e.g., Verf. Thür. [Constitution of Thuringia] art. 15
(state goal of appropriate living space).
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Rights -- are sometimes referred to as “first generation”
rights.
More recently some theorists have urged the adoption
of “third generation” rights -- which seem to require
further structural revisions of state and society -- such
as provisions relating to environmental protection. Of
course, there is nothing resembling a provision of this
sort in the 18th Century Constitution of the United States.
Both of our 20th Century constitutions, however, do have
such a provision, and the two provisions were adopted at
approximately the same time in the 1990s.
After the unification of Germany in 1990, the
Parliament undertook an examination of whether new
provisions should be added to the Basic Law, in order to
reflect changes in state or society arising from German
unification or otherwise. In the end, this process resulted
in very few constitutional changes other than structural
changes necessary to reflect the actual mechanics of
unification. But one of the few newly-added provisions was
Article 20a of the Basic Law, entitled “Protection of the
Natural Bases of Life”. Article 20a was a highly qualified
provision declaring that the state (in all of its branches)
will protect the “natural bases of life in the framework of
the constitutional order.” In the process of adopting this
amendment, there were vigorous (and rather philosophical)
debates about whether environmental protection should
benefit humans primarily, or whether its purpose is to
protect animals and plants in themselves. Article 20a seems
to take the position that environmental protection is
intended for present individuals as well as “for future
generations”. The possibilities of judicial enforcement of
this provision seem problematic, and it may well be that
the provision may ultimately be regarded as an
unenforceable “state goal.” 13

13

Interestingly, as far back as 1919, the Weimar
Constitution contained a provision declaring that the
“monuments of nature” as well as “the landscape” [die
Landschaft] enjoy the protection and cultivation of the
state. WRV Art 150(1). Moreover, a number of the new German
state constitutions also contain environmental provisions.
See, e.g., Verf. Sachs. [Constitution of Saxony] art. 10.
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The Constitution of South Africa also has a fairly
elaborate environmental provision (Article 24) which
guarantees the right “(a) to an environment that is not
harmful to... health or well being; and (b) to have the
environment protected, for the benefit of present and
future generations, through reasonable legislative and
other measures....” These measures should “prevent
pollution”, “promote conservation” and “secure ecologically
sustainable development... while promoting justifiable
economic and social development.”
The Constitution of India includes an environmental
provision among the “Directive Principles of State Policy”
in section 48-A (“The State shall endeavour to protect and
improve the environment and to safeguard the forest and
wildlife of the country”), and also among “the fundamental
duties” in section 51-A(g). According to this section,
citizens have a duty “to protect and improve the natural
environment including forests, lakes, rivers, and wild
life, and to have compassion for living creatures”.
4.

Coverage.

One of the most striking differences between the
laconic American Constitution of the 18th Century and our
20th Century constitutions is that, as society and political
structures have developed in complexity, many additional
subjects have been considered worthy of constitutional
attention. Thus, in addition to provisions on rights and
on the general structure of government, the Basic Law of
the Federal Republic of Germany and the South African
Constitution have a number of significant provisions on
topics that are completely without explicit coverage in the
Constitution of the United States.
Thus the German Basic Law contains a provision
generally regulating political parties and describing their
role in the polity; this provision also authorizes the
prohibition of anti-democratic parties by the
Constitutional Court.14 The South African Constitution
provides explicit rights to form and to be an active member
of a political party, but there is no provision for the
banning of parties -- a procedure that would have raised

14

Art. 21 GG.
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unpleasant memories in South Africa.15 Of course, the whole
concept of political parties in the modern sense did not
exist when the American Constitution was drafted in the
late 18th Century.
The Basic Law also contains a specific provision
granting detailed protections for labor unions16, while the
Constitution of South Africa contains an even more detailed
provision which is apparently directed toward providing
balanced protections for workers and trade unions, as well
as employers and employers associations, in labor relations
and collective bargaining.17 In another example, the Basic
Law regulates (in a very detailed manner) the circumstances
under which an individual may assert conscientious
objection to military service.18
Here are brief discussions of three additional areas
in which the problems of the 20th Century seem to have
impelled inclusion of important areas of coverage that are
basically missing in the 18th Century Constitution of the
United States.
A.

Administration.

The drafters of the U.S. Constitution were not much
concerned about providing rules and structures for the
administration of government -- after all, this was an era
in which the Secretary of State, having signed commissions
for the appointment of justices of the peace, had no
extensive staff to call on and therefore enlisted his
brother to carry out the task of delivering the commissions
to the intended recipients. Indeed, the Constitution does
not go further in the area of administration than to refer
from time to time to “executive Departments” or the “Heads
of Departments”.19 The President, of course has the
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CSA §19(1).

16

Art.9 (3)GG.

17

CSA §23.
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Arts. 4(3), 12a GG.

19

See, e.g., U.S. Const. Art. II §2, cl. 1, 2.
9

constitutional obligation to “take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.”20
When the “administrative state” began its impressive
rise in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, therefore,
these developments in the United States basically relied on
no explicit constitutional provisions, but rather on a
proliferation of statutory solutions. In a number of
interesting ways, however, our 20th Century constitutions do
attempt to deal with the subject of administration. The
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, for example,
makes clear that most federal law is to be enforced by the
administrative organs of the states and not by the federal
government itself.21 This is an approach to the “vertical”
separation of powers which contrasts in an interesting
manner with that of the United States: in the United
States, the states retain significant lawmaking power
because most law remains state law; in Germany, in
contrast, almost all law is federal law (including the
civil and criminal codes), but the states retain
significant authority in part because they are responsible
for administering most federal law. Other provisions in the
Basic Law, however, do allow the federal government to
supervise the state administration of federal law, when
necessary. Moreover the Basic Law explicitly sets aside
certain specific areas -- such as air traffic control, the
federal railroads, the federal bank, and roadways and
waterways -- which remain under direct federal control.22
In contrast, the South African Constitution tends to
rely on constitutionally mandated commissions to oversee
the administration of federal law, whose “basic values and
principles” are set out in a lengthy series of very general
statements.23 A Public Service Commission is responsible for
monitoring the administration and furnishing reports and
investigating grievances.24 In addition, in a chapter
entitled, “State Institutions Supporting Constitutional

20
21

U.S. Const. Art. II §3.
Art 83 GG.

22

Arts. 87-90 GG.

23

CSA §195 (1).

24

CSA §196.
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Democracy”, the constitution requires the establishment of
a number of supervisory officers, such as an ombudsman,
known as the “public protector”25 and an auditor general26,
as well as a series of commissions covering areas such as
human rights, rights of cultural, religious, and linguistic
communities, gender equality and elections27.
In what seems to be an attempt to further the
enforcement of rights of social welfare referred to above,
the South African Human Rights Commission “must require
relevant organs of state to provide the Commission with
information on the measures that they have taken towards
the realization of the rights in the Bill of Rights
concerning housing, health care, food, water, social
security, education and the environment.”28
B.

Financial Provisions.

In a similar manner, the 18th Century Constitution of
the United States does not say anything very specific about
finances. Rather, Congress is given the discretionary power
to raise and collect taxes and to spend for the general
welfare, and Article 1 makes clear that “all bills for
raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives.”29
In contrast, however, our 20th Century constitutions
have very elaborate provisions on what has been called the
“fiscal constitution”30. The financial provisions in both of

25
26

CSA 182.
CSA §188.

27

CSA §§ 184-187, 190.

28

CSA §184 (3).

29

U.S. Const. Art. I §7.

30

Arts. 104a-115 GG; CSA §§213-230A. See Kenneth W. Dam,
“The American Fiscal Constitution”, 44 University of
Chicago Law Review 271 (1977); Clifford Larsen, “States
Federal, Financial, Sovereign and Social. A Critical
Inquiry into an Alternative to American Financial
Federalism,” 47 American Journal of Comparative Law 429
(1999).
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these constitutions are quite daunting in length and
complexity, but in at least one respect they very
interestingly seek to achieve a common goal -- and that
goal is related, in part, to the goals of social welfare
which, as we have seen, are implicated in both
Constitutions, albeit more extensively stated in the
Constitution of South Africa. The financial provisions of
both constitutions assume (no doubt correctly) that certain
regions of the country (“states” [Länder] in Germany;
“provinces” in South Africa) will be substantially more
prosperous than others. Since one of the major tasks of the
various regions is to provide social welfare and other
basic services, these financial provisions are intended to
move toward equalization of per capita financial strength
among the various regions. Thus, in the Federal Republic of
Germany, these provisions require certain direct transfer
payments from more prosperous to less prosperous states, as
well as requiring increased payments from the federal
government to the weaker states.31 The Constitution of South
Africa contains similar financial goals.32 In the Federal
Republic of Germany, at least, there has been constant
litigation in the Constitutional Court concerning the level
of these obligations. Not surprisingly, the financially
stronger states have resisted higher obligations, while
increased enforcement has been insistently sought by the
states with fewer financial resources.
3. Emergencies. Both of our 20th Century
constitutions also have very elaborate provisions for
emergencies. In the case of Germany, these provisions were
added to the Basic Law in 1968, after a national
controversy that helped impel the radical student movement
of the late 1960s into popular consciousness: members of
the student movement, and other activists on the left,
feared that the introduction of the emergency provisions
foretold the slippage of Germany back into totalitarianism.
These provisions are triggered in the case of actual or
imminent attack on the Federal Republic and permit (among
other things) the deferral of elections, as well as
31

Art. 107 GG.

32

CSA §214; see generally CSA §§213-230A. In a manner that
parallels provisions concerning the administration more
generally, the Constitution of South Africa also creates a
Financial and Fiscal Commission to make recommendations on
financial matters. CSA §§220-222.
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government by a standing committee of Parliament. In point
of fact, however, these emergency provisions of the German
Basic Law have never been employed.33
Detailed emergency provisions are also found in the
South African Constitution.34 These provisions may be
triggered if “the life of the nation is threatened by war,
invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster
or other public emergency”35 and may be declared by the
National Assembly by majority vote for 21 days, and renewed
once by majority vote for 3 months and thereafter by 60%
vote of the National Assembly for successive 3-month
periods.36 The emergency may permit derogations from certain
provisions of the Bill of Rights (including detention
without trial) if “strictly required by the emergency” and
not inconsistent with international law.37
The Constitution of India also includes elaborate
emergency provisions, which allow suspension of certain
constitutional rights during the period of the emergency.38
The invocation of these provisions initiated a period of
dictatorial rule by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the
1970s, which was widely considered a grave abuse of power.
Accordingly the emergency provisions were somewhat narrowed
after the emergency was brought to an end.
Of course, the provisions on emergencies in the 18th
Century Constitution of the United States are very spare,
including brief statements in the Guaranty Clause of
Article 4 section 4, and the provision allowing the

33

See Arts. 53a, 115a – 115l GG.

34

CSA §37

35

CSA §37 (1) (a)

36

CSA §37 (2).

37

CSA §37 (4). See CSA §37 (5) (c) (incorporating Table of
Non-Derogable Rights).
38

CI §§352-60.
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suspension of habeas corpus in times of invision or
rebellion in Article 1 section 9.39
5.

Detail and Complexity.

In addition to covering a much wider range of areas
than were thought to be appropriate for constitutional
treatment in the 18th Century, our 20th Century constitutions
also treat in much greater detail areas that are covered by
more summary provisions -- sometimes just a phrase or
sentence -- in the Constitution of the United States.
Thus the allocation of authority between the federal
government and the states is more or less implicit in the
fairly cursory statement of the great heads of
congressional power, particularly the Commerce Clause. In
our 20th Century constitutions, in contrast, there are more
detailed provisions for “exclusive” legislative authority
and “concurrent” legislative authority of the federal
government and the regions. In the German Basic Law, for
example there is a list of 11 areas of exclusive federal
authority and 28 areas of concurrent authority, as well as
six additional areas in which the federal government is

39

Another very interesting contrast between the 18th Century
Constitution of the United States and our 20th Century
Constitutions concerns the constitutional role of
municipalities. Notwithstanding the extremely important
governing role of municipalities in colonial America,
municipalities (and other subdivisions of the states)
receive no mention in the Constitution of the United
States. In contrast, the rights and governmental roles of
municipalities -- and other regional subdivisions -receive prominent mention (sometimes in great detail) in
our 20th Century constitutions. See art. 28 (2) GG (right
of German localities [Gemeinden] to regulate their own
affairs); CSA §§151-164 (very elaborate provisions in the
South African Constitution establishing various categories
of municipalities and setting forth their powers and
functions, and regulating the composition and election of
municipal councils); CI §§243-243(ZG) (elaborate provisions
of the Constitution of India governing municipalities and
Panchayats -- institutions of rural self-government).
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authorized to enact “framework” legislation, the details of
which are to be filled in by the states.40
In the Constitution of South Africa the parliament has
general legislative authority, but the provinces share this
authority in approximately 48 areas specified as
“Functional Areas of Concurrent National and Provincial
Legislative Competence”; moreover, the provinces ordinarily
have exclusive authority in approximately 35 specified
areas -- including some areas ordinarily reserved to the
municipalities.41
But the most elaborate of these provisions are found
in the Constitution of India, in which 97 separate subjects
are included within the exclusive authority of the federal
parliament, approximately 52 subjects are included within
the list of concurrent authority of the federal government
and of the states, and approximately 61 separate items are
listed as within the exclusive authority of the states.42
Similarly, in the equality provision, the Basic Law
sets forth 8 specific factors which may not be the subject
of advantage or disadvantage in legislation -- perhaps
something like the suspect classifications of American
constitutional law, which are of course not specified in
the 14th Amendment or elsewhere in the Constitution of the
United States (except for race, gender and age with respect
to voting rights.) In the Basic Law, these prohibited
factors are “gender, ethnic origin, race, language, place
of origin [Heimat und Herkunft], belief, or religious or
political views.”43 In a similar provision, the South
African constitution lists the following impermissible
40

See Arts. 70-75 GG.

41

CSA §44 and Schedules 4 and 5.

42

See CI §§245-246, Schedule VII.

43

Art. 3 (3) GG. Moreover, the factor of disability may not
be taken into account in a manner that disadvantages an
individual -- although legislative provisions that grant
compensatory advantages are presumably permissible. Id.
A separate provision in the Basic Law requires that the
legislature create essentially equal conditions for “nonmarital children.” Art. 6 (5) GG.
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factors: “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status,
ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, age,
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language
and birth.”44
The Indian Constitution also includes “caste” in a
rather shorter listing of prohibited factors.45 Both the
Constitution of South Africa and -- especially -- the
Constitution of India also include explicit provisions on
affirmative action in favor of previously disadvantaged
groups.46
With respect to provisions on constitutional rights,
there is a similar contrast in the level of detail. For
example, where the Constitution of the United States speaks
in very summary fashion of the freedom of speech and of the
press (and the right of the people to assemble and petition
for redress of agreements), the Basic Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany explicitly protects, in addition to the
free expression of opinions “in word, writing, and
pictures”, the right to information from generally
accessible sources, press freedom and the freedom of
reporting (by means of radio and film), and art and
scholarship, research and teaching (as long as the latter
does not involve disloyalty to the constitution).47 In
separate sections, the Basic Law also protects a number of
other matters related to free expression: a right of
assembly,48 a right to form associations,49 a right to form
political parties,50 a right to petition the legislature,51
44

CSA 9 (3).

45

CI §15.

46

CSA §9 (2); CI §§15(4); 16(4)-(4-A). See also Art. 3 (2)
GG (provision of German Basic Law that may require
affirmative action for women).
47

Art. 5 GG.

48

Art. 8 GG.

49

Art. 9 GG.

50

Art. 21 GG.

51

Art. 17 GG.
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and a right to the secrecy of the post office and
telephones.52
In comparison with the relatively breezy language on
property rights in the 5th amendment of the United States
Constitution (“[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of...
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just
compensation”), the Constitution of South Africa has a very
elaborate provision on property, including a section on
compensation, which requires consideration of five separate
factors, only one of which is “the market value of the
property.”53
6.

The structure of rights provisions.

In the Constitution of the United States, the rights
set forth in the Bill of Rights (and also in subsequent
amendments) are generally stated without any explicit
indication that they may be limited or qualified in one way
or another. The result has been that the courts have often
interpreted constitutional rights by employing a technique
of definition, and the necessary limitations or
qualifications of the right are incorporated into the
definition itself. Thus, in the end, what does not lie
within the area of the protected right -- as so defined -is not protected.
Many 20th Century constitutions employ a rather
different technique, at least in part. Under this
technique, there are basically two sections in any rights
provisions: the first part sets forth the right in sweeping
terms, and then the second part introduces factors that may
result in the limitation or qualification of right. The
qualifications may be set forth in each rights provision
separately, or they may be stated in a single limiting
provision, which is then applicable to all or most rights
in the constitution.
This technique is employed, for example, in the free
speech provision of the German Basic Law. Thus Article 5,
section 1 sets forth a general right “to express ones

52

Art. 10 GG.

53

CSA §25.
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opinion in word, writing and pictures, etc....”. Article 5
section 2 then states, however, that “these rights find
their limits in the rules of the general laws, the
statutory rules for the protection of youth, and in the
right to personal honor.” Section 19 of the Indian
Constitution also employs this technique. Subsections (A)(G) set forth general rights of speech, assembly,
association, free movement within India, and a right of
occupation or trade -- each in broad and absolute terms.
Then subsections (2)-(6) set forth individual limiting
factors for each of these rights.
South Africa employs the second technique -- whereby a
single general provision qualifies all (or most)
constitutional rights. Thus, section 36 (1) of the South
African Constitution limits all of the rights of the Bill
of Rights. According to section 36, these rights may be
limited only by a “law of general application” if the
limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom”, and if certain additional relevant factors are
taken into account -- such as “the nature of the right...
[and] the importance of the purpose of the limitation”,
among others.
This technique -- which is also prominent in important
international human rights instruments, such as the
European Convention on Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights -- tends to lead to
a particular technique of adjudication. Whereas the typical
American technique involves an attempt to achieve a
definitional structure of the right, these “double
barreled” provisions -- with a statement of the right and
then a statement of permissible limitations -- tend to
yield judicial decisions that balance the right against the
limitation on a relatively ad hoc basis in each case. Such
a technique of ad hoc balancing may result in heightened
uncertainty about what the doctrine really is in a
particular constitutional area.54
7.

International Relations and International Law.
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The late 18th Century was by no means unconcerned with
questions of international law; indeed the basic framework
of the modern doctrine had been worked out a century
earlier by theorists such as Grotius. Yet international law
plays a relatively modest role in the actual text of the
Constitution of the United States. Treaties made “under the
authority of the United States” (which also included
important treaties entered into under the Articles of
Confederation), were proclaimed to be “the supreme law of
the land”55, and Congress was granted the authority to
“define and punish” Offenses against the Law of Nations.56
But that was about it.
The second half of the 20th Century, however, has seen
a great increase in the role that international law has
played in the world and in the way governments are
structured. Moreover, the scope and coverage of
international law itself has expanded dramatically in the
20th Century -- most notably in the development of
international humanitarian law in the Hague Conventions and
in the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949, as well as in
the adoption of international bills of human rights, such
as the International Covenant of Civil and Politic Rights
and the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Federal Republic of Germany, of course, emerged
from the ruins of the Nazi dictatorship, and the
governments of the Allies which supervised the West German
state in its early years were particularly interested in
assuring a strong presence of international law. The
Allies also sought to embed the fledgling democracy in a
series of international structures that would tend to
reduce the possibility of a resumption of the aggressive
characteristics of prior regimes.
Article 25 of the German Basic Law therefore
explicitly incorporates “the general rules of international
law” into federal law and goes further to state that those
55
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international rules will prevail over German statutes and
“create rights and duties directly” for inhabitants of
German territory.57 Article 26 GG explicitly prohibits the
planning of aggressive war, thus directly incorporating
into constitutional law one of the main principles of the
Nuremberg Charter.
Moreover, the close relationship of Germany and other
nations, particularly those in Europe, also receives
explicit constitutional recognition. Article 24 authorizes
the federal government to transfer sovereign rights to
international organizations, and to enter into a “system of
mutual collective security”, for the purpose of “creating
and assuring a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and
among the peoples of the world.” Moreover, after German
Unification, the Basic Law was amended to include a new
article 23, which authorizes Germany to enter into the
Maastricht Agreement (through which the German mark was
replaced by the Euro) and regulates the relationship of
Germany with the European Union.58 Also as a result of the
Maastricht agreement, Article 28 of the Basic Law was
amended to grant local voting rights (and rights to be a
candidate in local elections) to citizens of other European
Union states living in Germany.
Although South Africa obviously does not have the same
history as Germany, and is not embedded to the same extent
in regional institutions, international law also plays a
highly significant role in the South African Constitution.
The prominence of international law may well reflect the
important role played by international action (such as
57
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boycotts) -- based on concepts of international human
rights -- in the fall of the South African apartheid
regime.
In interpreting the Bill of Rights, therefore, section
39 of the South African Constitution requires that the
courts “must consider international law; and... may
consider foreign law.” In an international conflict,
moreover, “the state must comply with... international
humanitarian law” with respect to prisoners of war.59 In
light of South African history under apartheid, a long and
detailed constitutional section authorizing and regulating
the security services contains a number of provisions
binding those services to international law. According to
CSA §198(c), national security must be pursued in compliance
with law, including international law. Moreover, under CSA
§199 (5) “the security services must act, and must teach and
require their members to act, in accordance with the
Constitution and the law, including customary international
law and international agreements binding on the Republic.”
Finally, 200 (2) and 201 (2)(c) generally impose the
requirements of international law on the defense forces.60
8. Conclusion. Sometimes the process of comparative
law can yield at least as much illumination about ones own
system as about the foreign systems that one is
investigating. Looking back at the 18th Century
Constitution of the United States from the vantage point of
our 20th Century constitutions, we can see the accuracy of
Chief Justice Marshall’s reflection that the “nature” of a
constitution -- and he meant the Constitution of the United
States -- “requires that only its great outlines should be
marked, its important objectives designated, and the minor
ingredients which compose those objectives be deduced from
the nature of the objects themselves.” In contrast, we see
that our 20th Century constitutions do indeed include
several provisions that “partake of the prolixity of a
legal code.” Indeed, the Constitution of the United States
really does appear -- in this light -- as a fairly skeletal
59
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framework, with the resolution of most issues to be filled
in by legislative choice or, as later developed, by
judicial interpretation. Certainly to a greater extent
than its 20th century counterparts, the 18th century
Constitution of the United States, can be seen as mainly
providing a framework for the later working out of those
discretionary choices.
In contrast, our 20th Century constitutions attempt to
do a lot more. In a significantly broader range of areas,
these constitutions attempt to achieve a specific end -- or
at least greatly limit the legislature’s discretion in the
choice of limiting procedures. Indeed, it is common in
German constitutional theory at least, to refer to the
Basic Law as a constitution that sets forth “an ordering of
values”.61 These distinctions can perhaps be overdrawn, but
it is certainly the case that discretion is significantly
reduced in a number of areas by our 20th Century
constitutions.
Yet there is one significant factor in the 20th
Century constitutions that seems to cut in favor of more
discretion, and that is that, in general, many 20th Century
constitutions are considerably easier to amend then the
18th Century constitution of the United States. In their
slightly more than fifty years of existence, for example,
the constitutions of the Federal Republic of Germany and of
India have both been amended much more often than the
Constitution of the United States in its 200 year history.
Yet this ease of amendment may itself evoke a sort of
countervailing force. In both the Federal Republic of
Germany and in India the courts have maintained that
certain fundamental constitutional principles may not be
amended -- this principle is found in the text of the
German Basic Law62, and has been derived by interpretation
by the Supreme Court of India. Presumably, also, the South
African Constitution may not be amended in a manner that
clearly violates the basic principles that were the
foundation of the Constitution’s adoption, as required by
the Interim Constitution of 1994. Thus, even amidst the
proliferation of detail and breadth of coverage of these
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20th Century constitutions there seems to be an inner core
of fundamental principle that must remain unimpaired.
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